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Essays

All That Glitters
Isn’t Gold
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he increasing use of DNA evidence has revolutionized criminal investigations. Over the past
several years, DNA forensics—once thought to
be a less reliable identifier than other forensic techniques,
such as latent fingerprinting—have now become the evidentiary gold standard in criminal prosecutions. At the
same time, non-DNA-based forensic techniques that
have incarcerated thousands are coming under fire.
The policy implications of this shifting dynamic—
what Michael Lynch and colleagues call an “inversion of
credibility”1—can be most clearly seen in the National
Research Council’s 2009 report, Strengthening Forensic
Science in the United States: A Path Forward. Conducted
at Congress’s request by a highly esteemed committee,
this report—over three hundred pages—assesses the current state of forensic science.
The committee found remarkable shortcomings
in what they call the forensic science knowledge base,
noting that the scientific theories and methods used
to substantiate many forensic claims frequently cannot withstand close scrutiny. They found an alarmingly “wide variability in capacity, oversight, staffing,
certification, and accreditation.”2 For example, lack of
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transparency, susceptibility to bias, and questionable
methodologies for friction ridge analyses (analyses of the
prints left by fingers, palms, or soles) make it difficult
for two analysts to come to the same conclusion.3 The
report’s sobering message is that many forensic applications simply lack scientific rigor despite their routine use
in legal proceedings.
Although the committee acknowledges that DNA
forensics are not always perfect, the report and its recommendations are framed by an implied yet powerful
claim: non-DNA forensic techniques should live up to
the gold standard created by DNA typing. But this framing has its own serious drawbacks that obscure much
deeper issues concerning both technical matters related
to the scientific validity of extending basic DNA identification techniques to novel applications and the ethical,
legal, and social implications of DNA forensics’ expanding uses.
'1$([FHSWLRQDOLVP"
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he NRC report is replete with both general and
specific declarations that frame the accuracy and
reliability of DNA typing as the new standard for forensic investigations. At the broad end of the spectrum,
the committee notes “DNA typing is now universally
recognized as the standard against which many other
forensic individualization techniques are judged.”4 This
sentiment also shapes the analysis of specific techniques.
For example, they note that “overall, the process for toolmark and firearms comparison lacks the specificity of the
protocols for, say, 13 STR [short tandem repeat] DNA
analysis.”5
Few seriously doubt DNA typing’s high reliability in
determining whether any two isolated samples match.
Yet DNA typing is only one of many ways in which DNA
analyses are used in forensic investigations. For over two
decades, state and federal governments have been collecting convicted felons’ genetic profiles and depositing
them into databases in order to be able to identify repeat
offenders who leave biological samples at crime scenes.
DNA databases give rise to techniques beyond mere
DNA typing that expand criminal investigations’ scope
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and impact. This repository’s growth—the federal database
itself is almost at eight million profiles6—has given rise to
three related techniques: cold hits, partial matches, and familial searches.
“Cold hits” occur when investigators are able to match
unknown biological materials left at a crime scene with a
known database profile. Partial matches occur when investigators identify a suspect using fewer than thirteen loci—the
standard number of chromosome sites where, if identical,
a “match” between two profiles can be declared. Familial
searches work from the premise that relatives share many
identical loci. While the number of shared markers between
an unknown suspect and a
database hit might not incriminate the person with the
known profile, it can and has
pointed to a relative, who is
then the subject of a criminal
investigation.
Many assume that these
database-oriented techniques
have the same precision as
typing two individual samples. But what often gets obscured—as it does in the NRC
report—is that these newer
uses of DNA forensics share
many of the same shortcomings that the NRC identifies with non-DNA forensic
techniques.

databases.10 The FBI and several states have thus far refused
to comply.
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he NRC report is particularly concerned with forensic
science’s lack of standardization; the field has few established protocols on how to accurately describe the significance of such evidence. While this a demonstrable problem
with non-DNA forensics, it is also true for DNA evidence
related to database searches.
For example, with “cold-hit” evidence, where investigators run an unknown
sample against thousands of
database profiles in search of
a “hit,” any match is only as
significant as the statistical
probability that it might be
coincidental. Yet there is no
agreed-upon standard, much
less a gold standard, for how
to calculate this statistic or
how to present this evidence
in court.
The seemingly compelling
one-in-a-million statistic that
we often hear associated with
cold-hit matches uses a population figure as a referent—the
likelihood that an unknown
profile matches a suspect
(identified for other reasons)
purely by coincidence. However, cold-hit matches that
occur within databases have a substantially higher probability
of being coincidental; when searching through large databases
with millions of profiles (like the federal database), there are
millions of chances for coincidental matches.11 Transposing
the statistical significance of the former approach to the latter
is what is often referred to as the prosecutor’s fallacy and has
been known to impact determinations of individuals’ guilt or
innocence.12
The substantially diminished probabilities stemming
from cold-hit database searches that take database size into
account more accurately reflect the statistical limitations of
this approach. This has led an NRC committee13 and an FBI
advisory board14 to recommend making these database limitations part of the calculation. Yet neither recommendation
has been widely implemented by authorities. While the committee briefly points to these prior recommendations, they
do not fully discuss how the absence of consistently enforced
standards, procedures, or oversight can lead courts to receive
misleading information that can undermine DNA forensics’
credibility as much as a failure to standardize non-DNA forensics affects its integrity.

Many assume that these
database-oriented techniques
are as precise as typing two
individual samples. But they
share many shortcomings
with less reliable, non-DNA
forensic methods.
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NA databases gain much of their authority from the
oft-repeated claim that the chance that two profiles will
randomly match—even partially—is only one in several million. It has been argued that a nine-locus match can uniquely
identify perpetrators,7 and individuals have been convicted
on such partial-match evidence.
However, increasing evidence suggests that the way scientists have calculated the probability for random matches
may not be accurate. Data obtained from the Arizona state
DNA database showed that out of 65,493 profiles, 122 pairs
matched at nine loci, twenty pairs matched at ten, and two
pairs (siblings) matched at eleven and twelve loci.8 Findings
from the Illinois state database yielded similar results: 903
pairs matched at nine or more loci out of a total of more than
200,000 profiles. Data from the Maryland database, with
30,000 profiles, was also surprising: thirty-two pairs matched
at nine loci, and three matched at all thirteen.9
How could so many profiles randomly match at so many
loci? No one knows for sure, which is why scientists and legal
scholars are calling for more access to research government
+$67,1*6& ( 1 7 ( 5  5 ( 3 257
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hile DNA typing itself is far from infallible, database-oriented DNA forensics raise a profound series
of second-order questions for entire groups, in contrast to
the NRC report’s singular focus on individuals. Much of
this stems from the unique ways in which the criminal justice system interacts with blacks and Latinos, particularly
through policies regarding DNA databases. For example, the
overpolicing of minority communities, along with related
injustices, has led to these groups’ dramatic overrepresentation in prisons; 30 percent of black males will be convicted
of a felony at least once compared to 5 percent of whites, and
an adult black male is eight times more likely to be incarcerated.15 Aggressive public policies encouraging sample collections for almost any contact with law enforcement is leading
to an alarming statistic: although blacks represent only 13
percent of the population, they make up an estimated 40
percent of federal DNA database profiles.16
Given the disparate composition of DNA databases,
techniques like familial searching raise significant questions
regarding systemic bias. Leveraging the shared genetic variants and short tandem repeat lengths between relatives to
find suspects will have a much larger impact on blacks and
Latinos. What does it mean for government to turn people
with existing stored profiles into “genetic informants” on
their relatives without their knowledge or consent and with
few safeguards to prevent wrongful convictions from errant
cold hits? What are the ethical, political, and legal implications of placing a population under a lifetime of genetic surveillance in which each DNA fragment shared with a banked
relative is screened against future crime scene evidence? And
is it just for these significant civil liberties concerns to disproportionately fall upon groups already unfairly burdened by
injustices linked to what we know to be selective patterns of
law enforcement?17
:RUWK,WV:HLJKW,Q*ROG"
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n addition to these concerns, several other technical issues
and questionable practices with unresolved social and ethical implications also plague DNA forensics. On the technical side, contaminated samples can lead to false positives and
false negatives, clerical errors can lead to incorrectly logged
samples and poor data entry, and crime labs can misinterpret old, small, or mixed samples from multiple individuals.
These and other technical issues are linked to broader social
and ethical issues, such as varying practices regarding the
destruction of samples after law enforcement has analyzed
them, the propriety of using forensic samples for nonforensic purposes like research, the ethics of surreptitious sample
acquisition by police, and a host of other privacy issues connected to the general idea of the government storing sensitive genetic information indefinitely.
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Public policy regarding the use and expansion of DNA
forensics is evolving as quickly as the technologies themselves. For example, a California law that went into effect
in 2009 allows authorities to take and retain DNA samples
from individuals merely arrested—not charged or convicted—for felonies.18 And New York enacted a law in late 2009
allowing authorities to use DNA database partial matches to
identify suspects.19 This highlights a current trend, whereby
law is being used to radically expand DNA databases to include larger, unsuspecting portions of the population.
The NRC report and its recommendations represent an
important first step to putting the scientific method’s rigor
into forensics so that justice can prevail. If we are to take the
report as seriously as it deserves, then the critiques it raises
for non-DNA forensic applications must also be applied to
the growing spectrum of DNA forensics. Like our prior uncritical acceptance of latent fingerprint technology, the new
proverbial gold standard might, on closer inspection, have
far more tarnish then we have been led to believe.
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Questioning the
Universality of
Medical Ethics:
Dilemmas Raised
Performing Surgery
around the Globe
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erforming surgery in the developing world presents
unique challenges and dilemmas for the visiting physician from an industrialized country. Language barriers, widespread, profound pathology, and lack of adequate
facilities are obvious hurdles. A more subtle problem, though
every bit as significant, is that the principles and procedures
we routinely utilize at home to uphold ethical standards of
care and to aid us in decision-making are often poorly applicable in the developing world. Acknowledging that cultural
factors play a primary role in every aspect of their interaction
with patients, physicians must scrutinize and even modify the
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tools they employ when attempting to deliver ethical care in
foreign environments.
Over the past two decades, I have routinely taken time
from clinical practice to teach, practice, and perform eye surgery in remote locations. I’ve enjoyed the privilege of vastly
broadening both my professional skills and global perspective while working with some of the most devoted and selfless health care workers I’ve encountered in my career. From
Mongolia to points along the ancient Silk Route, to the deep
Himalayas, to Southeast Asia, to sub-Saharan Africa, many
of the locations where I’ve worked lack basic facilities including potable water, reliable electricity, and proper sanitation.
Nearly all lack what an ophthalmologist considers requisite
for even the most basic intraocular surgery: adequate illumination and magnification. If available at all, the precise instrumentation necessary to manipulate tissue within the eye
is usually worn or broken due to overuse and repeated repair.
Cutting instruments are blunt; forcep tips no longer meet.
Disposable equipment acquired through donation is meticulously cleaned and reused far beyond its intended lifespan,
and medications are routinely expired or implicitly understood to be the “best available.” Surgical gloves and sutures
are resterilized and used as long as possible. Dressings are ingeniously fashioned from material of every imaginable sort.
Indeed, resourcefulness and ingenuity are the unique and
necessary attributes of doctors and their staff throughout the
developing world.
I am always presented with highly advanced pathology
when working abroad, due in part to a chronic shortage of
trained medical personnel and resources. Whether their ailments are secondary to trauma or to neglected or indolent
disease, indigent patients usually seek care only when there is
no alternative. The numbers are shocking: According to the
most recent World Health Organization estimates, approximately 87 percent of the 314 million visually impaired live
in developing countries; roughly 45 million are completely
blind.1 About 85 percent of all visual impairment and 75 percent of blindness could be prevented or cured.2 While procedures performed to save or restore sight do not directly save
lives, they are nevertheless crucial to survival in subsistencelevel societies. A blind person often represents an untenable
responsibility for both the family and the community. It is
believed that 60 percent to 80 percent of children who become blind in the developing world die within two years.3
A Nepalese proverb conveys the economic reality most concisely: “A blind person has a mouth but no hands.”
In all of medicine, there is a unique burden associated with
the decision to perform surgery. This arises, I suspect, from
the very nature of an operation’s invasiveness, and is compounded by the unpredictable perils of intraoperative and
postoperative complications. In the industrialized world, a
surgeon’s decision to operate is not only strongly supported
by well-defined ethical principles, but also facilitated by procedural tools that help to ensure the maintenance of these principles in daily practice. The most well-known is perhaps the
Hippocratic edict to do no harm. Every graduating medical
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